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COGNITIVE STYLE AND REPRESENTATIONAL 
STRATEGIES IN CATEGORICAL 
SYLLOGISTIC REASONING 
By 
TAKANORI MAT SUN 0 (;j0!fllijtU)' 
(Tolwku University) 
The present study focuses on various mental representations adopted in categorical syllogis-
tic reasoning. Twenty-four under-graduates solved multiple-choice categorical syllogistic prob-
lems and were classified into three representation groups by forcedchoice strategy selection. 
Reasoning accuracy of these groups differed only on the problems in which none of the presented 
propositional conclusions was valid. And the subjects of these groups showed differences in 
their scores on Richardson's (1977) Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire completed beforehand. 
It is suggested that the individuals' cognitive style influenced their preference to representational 
strategies in reasoning. 
Key words: cognitive style, mental represontation, strategy, categorical syllogism, deduc-
tive reasoning, Verbalizer - Visualizer Questionnaire 
INTRODUCTION 
In solving a problem people may take various approaches according to their 
dispositions and environmental conditions. Some researchers reported that individ-
uals spontaneously adopt a number of strategies which differ in the way to represen.t 
task information mentally, in the sentence-picture verification task (MacLeod et al., 
1978; Mathews et al., 1980) and the three-term series problem (Egan et al., 1982). So 
it would be not surprising if the same is true of a more complex but essentiaily similar 
task, the categorical syllogism. 
Matsuno (1986) analyzed retrospective protocol of 15 undergraduates who had just 
solved categorical syllogisms, and differentiated three kinds of representational strat-
egies labeled as "Diagrammatic", "Elemental", and "Verbal" strategies. Moreover, 
each subject was classified into one of the three representation groups, and the group 
performances were compared. The error rates of those groups did not differ on the 
problems in which at least one of the presented propositional conclusions is logically 
followed from the given premises, but did differ on the problems in which non of such 
conclusions is valid. The error rate on these latter problems was highest for the 
Verbal group and lowest for the Diagrammatic group, and the differences among the 
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three groups were statistically significant. 
The first purpose of the present study IS to re-examme the validity for 
differentiating the representational strategies, with a modified procedure for classifying 
subjects. In the previous experiment the classification of the subjects was done by the 
experimenter on the basis of subjects' protocol. But in the present experiment, 
written descriptions of the representational strategies are prepared and subjects are 
asked to choose the most similar one to their own way. A more objective evidence for 
the differentiation will be obtained if the above-mentioned results are replicated in this 
experiment. 
The second purpose of this study is to examine a tentative factor which may 
influence the individual's preference to a representational strategy. It is the individ-
ual's habitual mode of processing cognitive events. Richardson (1977) constructed the 
"Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ)", picking up 15 items from Paivio's 
(1971) "Individual Difference Questionnaire (IDQ)". Nine of those 15 items could 
reliably discriminate between left-movers ands right-movers of lateral eye movements 
in answering various questions. Such preference of direction was explained with 
reference to the functional asymmetry of the brain hemispheres. Thus a score of VVQ 
is regarded as an index of an individual's position at the Verbalizer-Visualizer 
dimension of cognitive style. By measuring VVQ scores of the subejects who belong 
to each representation group, the relationships between cognitive style and the re-
presentational strategies will be investigated. 
METHOD 
Subjects: Twenty-five male undergraduates at the Tohoku University participat-
ed as subjects and were tested individually. 
Materials: 
VVQ 
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (Richardson, 1977) was the 15-item question-
naire. Respondents could answer "True" or "False" to each item. Thus possible 
scores ranged 0 to 15. It was assumed that a low score indicates strong verbalizing 
tendencies and a high score indicates strong visualizing tendencies. 
Categorical Syllogism 
Thirty-six categorical syllogistic problems were presented on a microcomputer 
display. Each problem had a pair of premises and five response alternatives. The 
2. Traditionally, these letters refer to the four kinds of propositions: universal affirmative (A), 
universal negative (E), paticular affirmative (I), and paticular negative (0). 
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alternatives were four propositional conclusions (i.e. A2, E, I, and 0) and one non-
propositional conclusion (i.e. "None of these are valid."). The subject's task was to 
select a response alternative that logically followed from the premise pair. 
The premise pairs of the problems were consisted of two types. At 18 pairs 
(AA-33, AA-4, AE-2, AE-4, AI-I, AI-3, AO-2, EA-l, EA-2, EA-3, EA-4, EA-l, EI-2, 
EI-3, EI-4, IA-3, IA-4, OA-3), at least one propositional conclusion out of four can 
logically follow from each pair on a basis of the standard logic interpretation. At the 
remaining 18 pairs (AE-l, AE-3, AI-2, AO-3, EE-2, EE-3, EO-I, EO-3, lA-I, IE-2, 
IE-3, II-2, II-3, OA-4, 01-1, 01-4, 00-1, 00-4), the non-propositional conclusion is 
regarded as the correct answer. These were called as "Propositional Conclusion (PC)" 
problems and "Non-propositional Conclusion (NC)" problems. 
Each problem referred to hypothetical sets of geometric figures. The subject-term 
described the shape of a set ("circle", "triangle", or "square"), the middle-term 
described the marking of a set ("vertically striped", "horizontally striped", or 
"checked"), and the predicate-term described the color of a set ("red", "blue", or 
"yellow"). 
Procedure: At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects were told to com-
plete VVQ. Then the experimenter explained about the syllogistic tasks and the 
operation of keyboard. The AA-l problem was provided as a practice. The experi-
mental trials were presented in two blocks. In each block 9 PC-type problems and 9 
NC-type problems were presented in random order. Between blocks a 5-minute break 
was given. After the second block was over, written brief descriptions of three kinds 
of representational strategies were given to the subjects. These were "A. I imagined 
several concrete figures.", "B. I thought intuitively on the basis of verbal expressions 
of premises.", and "C. I imagined diagrams which represent the set relations (e.g. Venn's 
circle).". The subjects were asked to arrange these descriptions in the order of 
similarity between each description and their own way twice on both experimental 
blocks. 
RESULTS 
Classification of the subjects 
At first the subjects were classified into three kinds of representation groups 
according to their ordering of the strategy descriptions. Table 1 presents the number 
of subjects who chose each description as most similar with his own way on the first 
and the second experimental blocks. Nine subjects who chose the B on both blocks 
were placed in the Verbal group. Ten subjects who chose the A on at least one block 
were placed in the Elemental group. Five subjects who chose the C on at least one 
block were placed in the Diagrammatic group. One subject who chose the A on the 
3. In this notation, the first and the second letters identify the propositions in the first (major) and 
the second (minor) premises, respectively. And the number refer to the fignre of the syllogism. 
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Table l. Number of subjects who chose each description as most similar 
with their own way on the first and the second expermiental 
blocks. 
First Second Classification 
B B Verbal 9 
A A Elemental 4 
C C Diagrammatic 3 
A B Elemental 3 
B A Elemental 3 
C B Diagrammatic 
B C Diagrammatic 
C A (eliminated) 
A C 0 
first block and the 0 on the second block was eliminated from further analysis. 
Response accuracy 
Table 2 presents the mean number of errors made by each group on each type of 
the problems. The groups did not differ in accuracy on PO problems but did differ on 
NO problems. Two-way mixed analysis of variance was conducted with group and 
problem type. The main effect of group was significant (F (2, 21) = 5.484, P = .012). 
And the interaction between group and problem type was highly significant (F (2, 
21) = 7.446, p = .004). In addition, the group difference on NO problems was examined 
by a Tukey test. The Diagrammatic group and the Elemental group differed at the 
.05 level, and the Diagrammatic and the Verbal group differed at the .01 level. The 
difference between the Elemental group and the Verbal group was not statistically 
significant. 
VVQ score 
The mean VVQ score, by groups, was 10.5 for the Elemental, 8.9 for the Verbal 
and 8.0 for the Diagrammatic group. A one-way ANOV A showed a significant group 
difference (F(2, 21)=12.118, p=.009). And the Elemental group differed from the 
other groups at the .05 level by a Tukey test. 
Table 2. Mean number of errors of each representation 
group in each problem type. 
Group 
Verbal 
Elemental 
Diagrammatic 
PC 
5.7 
5.2 
5.6 
NC 
9.2 
6.6 
2.2 
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DISCUSSION 
In terms of the accuracy of responses, the results of this experiment had the same 
tendencies as those of Matsuno (1986) did, although the difference between Elemental 
and Verbal groups was not so clear. The groups differed only on the problems in 
which none of the presented propositional conclusions was valid. To use non-verbal 
additional representations (especially Venn's like diagrams) seems to improve the 
efficiency in rejecting invalid conclusions. A related finding was provided by a study 
focusing the difference between the good and poor reasoners in categorical syllogistic 
reasoning. GaIotti et al. (1986) reported that novice good and poor reasoners and 
experts did not differ in accuracy on the problems which had a logically necessary 
conclusion but did differ on the problems which did not have. The results of the 
present experiment suggest that the difference between good and poor reasoners could 
be attributed not only to different degrees of proficiency in a strategy, but also to 
different representational strategies. 
It might be a matter of course that the individuals' VVQ scores were higher in the 
Elemental group and lower in the Verbal group. Those who reported much use of 
images of elements had more visualizing tendencies, and those who claimed to have 
reasoned verbally had more verbalizing tendencies. However it was rather un-
expected that VVQ scores were relatively low in the Diagrammatic group. Because 
the Venn's like diagrams in mind were in a sense "visual", as well as the images of 
elements. But such diagrams were derived from a formal symbol system which the 
subjects had been taught in school, while the images were more content specific and the 
subjects naturally learned to use them. That is, they were products of the two 
different types of abstraction "Abstraction by Recoding" vs. "Content-based Abstrac-
tion", named by D'Andrade (1981). The "Visualizer" indicated by VVQ may have a 
closer relation to the latter process. 
In conclusion, the differentiation of the representational strategies was generally 
re-confirmed. And it seems that the Verbalizer-Visualizer dimension of cognitive 
style has a substantial influence on the individual's preference to a representational 
strategy in categorical syllogistic reasoning. 
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